ISSN 
1999 Vol. 28, No. 6
1999, 28(6): 563-569.
Abstract:
A signalling game theory model of market with counterfeit products is constructed in this paper. According to the model, products produced by enterprises which have stronger market power are liable to be counterfeited. From the model, some meaningful inferences suggest that the government should strengthen the punishment on or inspecting of counterfeit products-makers, which is conducive to the withdrawal of counterfeit products-makers from the market.
A signalling game theory model of market with counterfeit products is constructed in this paper. According to the model, products produced by enterprises which have stronger market power are liable to be counterfeited. From the model, some meaningful inferences suggest that the government should strengthen the punishment on or inspecting of counterfeit products-makers, which is conducive to the withdrawal of counterfeit products-makers from the market.
1999, 28(6): 570-574.
Abstract:
Positive analysis of competitions on the Chengdu-Chongqing passengers' market is conducted using game model. The research with Stacketbers model shows that the Chengdu-Chongqing passengers' transportation market reaches Nash equilibrium before the express highway enters it. Price game model indicates that avoidance of fierce competition by price deduction is the best strategy for both parties. Results of PUV games betWeen passengers reveal that passengers distribution in different means of transportation is the outcome of the game on their overall effects.
Positive analysis of competitions on the Chengdu-Chongqing passengers' market is conducted using game model. The research with Stacketbers model shows that the Chengdu-Chongqing passengers' transportation market reaches Nash equilibrium before the express highway enters it. Price game model indicates that avoidance of fierce competition by price deduction is the best strategy for both parties. Results of PUV games betWeen passengers reveal that passengers distribution in different means of transportation is the outcome of the game on their overall effects.
1999, 28(6): 575-577.
Abstract:
This paper gives a result that the incentive effect is related to the elasticity of demand.When a contract is based on the sale, the absolute risk avoidable degree is not the only decisive factor for incentive effect. The model's policy meaning is that the sellers with higher absolute risk avoidable degree should be charged with the sale task in areas with a higher elasticity of demand, and some competition mechanism should be drawn into the marketing management.
This paper gives a result that the incentive effect is related to the elasticity of demand.When a contract is based on the sale, the absolute risk avoidable degree is not the only decisive factor for incentive effect. The model's policy meaning is that the sellers with higher absolute risk avoidable degree should be charged with the sale task in areas with a higher elasticity of demand, and some competition mechanism should be drawn into the marketing management.
1999, 28(6): 578-581.
Abstract:
This paper builds an optimal capital structure game model under the condition of nois emarket, and presents the functions with noise risk of value of shares, value of debts and capital structure.The influences of the noise on value of shares, value of debts and capital structure are also discussed.
This paper builds an optimal capital structure game model under the condition of nois emarket, and presents the functions with noise risk of value of shares, value of debts and capital structure.The influences of the noise on value of shares, value of debts and capital structure are also discussed.
1999, 28(6): 582-585.
Abstract:
This paper studies manager's constrain from capital structure, presents the condition of bankruptcy and firing, and analyzes the relation betWeen capital structure and efficiency.The conclusion is also drawn that the owner of the company can design a capital structure to make the manager's operation more efficient.
This paper studies manager's constrain from capital structure, presents the condition of bankruptcy and firing, and analyzes the relation betWeen capital structure and efficiency.The conclusion is also drawn that the owner of the company can design a capital structure to make the manager's operation more efficient.
1999, 28(6): 586-590.
Abstract:
Efficiently operating the system of controlling and fighting against counterfeit and inferior depends on the descriptions of gems' rational activities of the system. Based on the game analysis, some models are formulated to analyze the affecting factors between the system gemts. This paper also gives some suggestions.
Efficiently operating the system of controlling and fighting against counterfeit and inferior depends on the descriptions of gems' rational activities of the system. Based on the game analysis, some models are formulated to analyze the affecting factors between the system gemts. This paper also gives some suggestions.
1999, 28(6): 591-595.
Abstract:
Some problems about rational assumption in experimental economics are discussed in this paper Several paradox in economic experiments are raised. Rational and irrational factors included are analyzed. Four pieces of conclusions ale drawn that the:maximization of individual utility or benefits can not be ensured under rational assumption; rational assumption is influenced by behavior repetition; rational assumption is influenced by claim for "justice"; and irrational factors are influenced by their cultural background.
Some problems about rational assumption in experimental economics are discussed in this paper Several paradox in economic experiments are raised. Rational and irrational factors included are analyzed. Four pieces of conclusions ale drawn that the:maximization of individual utility or benefits can not be ensured under rational assumption; rational assumption is influenced by behavior repetition; rational assumption is influenced by claim for "justice"; and irrational factors are influenced by their cultural background.
1999, 28(6): 596-600.
Abstract:
This paper puts forward secrete systems of monopoly goods by considering monopolists,resellers and consumers. The retail price strategies of vertical constraints and vertical integration are discussed, and some important price strategies are given.
This paper puts forward secrete systems of monopoly goods by considering monopolists,resellers and consumers. The retail price strategies of vertical constraints and vertical integration are discussed, and some important price strategies are given.
1999, 28(6): 601-604.
Abstract:
This paper builds a game model betWeen company and government, and analyzes the adaptbility of capital structUre to macroeconomic policy. The optimal capital structure function is also given. which includes the variable of macroeconomic policy. The influences of the macroeconomic policy on the optimal capital structure of the company are discussed.
This paper builds a game model betWeen company and government, and analyzes the adaptbility of capital structUre to macroeconomic policy. The optimal capital structure function is also given. which includes the variable of macroeconomic policy. The influences of the macroeconomic policy on the optimal capital structure of the company are discussed.
1999, 28(6): 605-608.
Abstract:
This paper analyzes the effects on vertical meaders in several typical micro-economic situation and gives some advisable conclusions which are conducive to the meager action. The production function includes fixed-preportional function and variable-proportional function. Some important conclusions are also drawn in this paper
This paper analyzes the effects on vertical meaders in several typical micro-economic situation and gives some advisable conclusions which are conducive to the meager action. The production function includes fixed-preportional function and variable-proportional function. Some important conclusions are also drawn in this paper
1999, 28(6): 609-613.
Abstract:
This paper analyzes the disthbution of property right in merder on the basis of theory of phncipal-agent which is of importance for the inner stimulation and control of a company.
This paper analyzes the disthbution of property right in merder on the basis of theory of phncipal-agent which is of importance for the inner stimulation and control of a company.
1999, 28(6): 614-617.
Abstract:
Game theory is applied to analyze the action of merder in this paper Under thehypothesis of non-variable scale or variable scale, this paper formulates the effect of integration/melgerwhich includes the price, quantities, profitS for the mergers or not and puts forward the concept of "optimalscale of meadedr". The result is advisable for the assets reconstruction and economic reform.
Game theory is applied to analyze the action of merder in this paper Under thehypothesis of non-variable scale or variable scale, this paper formulates the effect of integration/melgerwhich includes the price, quantities, profitS for the mergers or not and puts forward the concept of "optimalscale of meadedr". The result is advisable for the assets reconstruction and economic reform.
1999, 28(6): 618-620.
Abstract:
This paper studies a part of motives of horizontal merge with the frame of Cournot competition. The merge for more market power is unprofitable, but the merge for cost saving can be profitable. It is found that capacity restriction is another cause of merge, and merge are more likely to happen for firms with higher capacity. It is a complement to the theory of merge.
This paper studies a part of motives of horizontal merge with the frame of Cournot competition. The merge for more market power is unprofitable, but the merge for cost saving can be profitable. It is found that capacity restriction is another cause of merge, and merge are more likely to happen for firms with higher capacity. It is a complement to the theory of merge.
1999, 28(6): 621-624.
Abstract:
On the question about non-monopoly Bass models, this paper presentS the competition and diffusion models about two products, and analyzes the diffusion procedure from economy, which provides theoretical proof for forecasting and imitating the dynamic market structure.
On the question about non-monopoly Bass models, this paper presentS the competition and diffusion models about two products, and analyzes the diffusion procedure from economy, which provides theoretical proof for forecasting and imitating the dynamic market structure.
1999, 28(6): 625-628.
Abstract:
On the question about non-monopoly of Bass models, this paper presents the competition and diffusion model about two products in advertisement, and analyzes the diffusion procedure further. It also gives a theoretical proof for forecasting and imitating of the dynamic market structure.
On the question about non-monopoly of Bass models, this paper presents the competition and diffusion model about two products in advertisement, and analyzes the diffusion procedure further. It also gives a theoretical proof for forecasting and imitating of the dynamic market structure.
1999, 28(6): 629-631.
Abstract:
The model of the optimal nonlinear pricing with two groups of customers is developed in this paper How monoplists who know customers' demand distribution determine prices according to the system of customers' self-selection is shown. It is concluded that the monopolists largely decrease the quantity of low-demand customers and occupy utility of more customers to gain more profits.
The model of the optimal nonlinear pricing with two groups of customers is developed in this paper How monoplists who know customers' demand distribution determine prices according to the system of customers' self-selection is shown. It is concluded that the monopolists largely decrease the quantity of low-demand customers and occupy utility of more customers to gain more profits.
1999, 28(6): 632-634.
Abstract:
The formula of two-part pricing for two groups of customers are drawn in this paper. It is concluded that the optimal marginal price depends on the differentiation of customers' preference and the marginal cost. Relationship between two-part pricing and demand elastic is also discussed. The range of the optimal marginal range is also calculated.
The formula of two-part pricing for two groups of customers are drawn in this paper. It is concluded that the optimal marginal price depends on the differentiation of customers' preference and the marginal cost. Relationship between two-part pricing and demand elastic is also discussed. The range of the optimal marginal range is also calculated.
1999, 28(6): 635-641.
Abstract:
Based on the price question of peak load when demand is dynamic presented by Machael.R, this paper give a new price model of regUlation under the practical hypothesis. It is concluded that different price strategies market make different influences on the market under different stages, which deepers the result of Michael.
Based on the price question of peak load when demand is dynamic presented by Machael.R, this paper give a new price model of regUlation under the practical hypothesis. It is concluded that different price strategies market make different influences on the market under different stages, which deepers the result of Michael.
1999, 28(6): 642-646.
Abstract:
This paper deals with price discrimination from viewpoints of monopolists and discusses the influences of quality discrimination and price discrimination to the marginal utility and society welfare.
This paper deals with price discrimination from viewpoints of monopolists and discusses the influences of quality discrimination and price discrimination to the marginal utility and society welfare.
1999, 28(6): 647-651.
Abstract:
In this paper, quality selection and price-making of monopoly goods are analyzed based on the optimal control theory from social viewpoint. The impact of government intervention on social welfare is discussed. It is possible to induce geometric property of monopoly goods with respect to quality and price level. The dynamical properties of quality and price of goods are investigated.
In this paper, quality selection and price-making of monopoly goods are analyzed based on the optimal control theory from social viewpoint. The impact of government intervention on social welfare is discussed. It is possible to induce geometric property of monopoly goods with respect to quality and price level. The dynamical properties of quality and price of goods are investigated.
1999, 28(6): 652-654.
Abstract:
A model of advertising competition with duopoly is established. Through the equilibrium of two-stage game, the cost condition is drawn when advertising investment forms barriers to entry。It is concluded that firms will take advantages of preemptive advertising which would be a kind of barrier to barrier to entry. But it will not last for a long time.
A model of advertising competition with duopoly is established. Through the equilibrium of two-stage game, the cost condition is drawn when advertising investment forms barriers to entry。It is concluded that firms will take advantages of preemptive advertising which would be a kind of barrier to barrier to entry. But it will not last for a long time.
1999, 28(6): 655-658.
Abstract:
This paper builds a dynamical system of competition trade betWeen tWo countries by considering intra-industry international trade and analyzes the stability of the system while the tariff and exchange rate are varying. This paper also investigates the competition price strategies of companies under the same circumstance, which is important both in theory and practice.
This paper builds a dynamical system of competition trade betWeen tWo countries by considering intra-industry international trade and analyzes the stability of the system while the tariff and exchange rate are varying. This paper also investigates the competition price strategies of companies under the same circumstance, which is important both in theory and practice.
1999, 28(6): 659-662.
Abstract:
This paper builds an international trade dynamical syStems for the intra-industry international trade, then analyzes the stability of the intra-industry international trade, and discusses the effects of the adjustment of exchange rate and tariff on international trade.
This paper builds an international trade dynamical syStems for the intra-industry international trade, then analyzes the stability of the intra-industry international trade, and discusses the effects of the adjustment of exchange rate and tariff on international trade.
1999, 28(6): 663-666.
Abstract:
Base on the elasticity theory and econometrics methods, this paper studies the interest rate quantitatively. The final submission is:the rate policy takes a littie effect; it is difficult to market by purely rate adjustment.
Base on the elasticity theory and econometrics methods, this paper studies the interest rate quantitatively. The final submission is:the rate policy takes a littie effect; it is difficult to market by purely rate adjustment.
