成渝客运市场博弈分析

龙志和, 辛亚萍

龙志和, 辛亚萍. 成渝客运市场博弈分析[J]. 电子科技大学学报, 1999, 28(6): 570-574.
引用本文: 龙志和, 辛亚萍. 成渝客运市场博弈分析[J]. 电子科技大学学报, 1999, 28(6): 570-574.
Long Zhihe, Xing Yaping. Analysis of Game of Chengdu-Chongqing Passengers' Transportation Market[J]. Journal of University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, 1999, 28(6): 570-574.
Citation: Long Zhihe, Xing Yaping. Analysis of Game of Chengdu-Chongqing Passengers' Transportation Market[J]. Journal of University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, 1999, 28(6): 570-574.

成渝客运市场博弈分析

基金项目: 

国家杰出青年科学基金:79725002

详细信息
    作者简介:

    龙志和 男 45岁 在职博士生 教授

  • 中图分类号: F224.32;O225

Analysis of Game of Chengdu-Chongqing Passengers' Transportation Market

  • 摘要: 运用博弈模型对成渝容运市场竞争状况进行了实证分析。采用斯塔伯格竞争模型研究结论认为,在高速公路进入前,成渝客运市场已达到纳什均衡。价格博弈模型表明,铁路与高速公路竞争中,避免价格战是双方最优主导战略。旅客间的PUV博弈结果证明,成渝客运市场中旅客在不同运输方式中的分布是对其总效用博弈的结果。
    Abstract: Positive analysis of competitions on the Chengdu-Chongqing passengers' market is conducted using game model. The research with Stacketbers model shows that the Chengdu-Chongqing passengers' transportation market reaches Nash equilibrium before the express highway enters it. Price game model indicates that avoidance of fierce competition by price deduction is the best strategy for both parties. Results of PUV games betWeen passengers reveal that passengers distribution in different means of transportation is the outcome of the game on their overall effects.
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出版历程
  • 收稿日期:  1999-09-01
  • 刊出日期:  1999-12-14

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