经营者生产性努力与产品市场竞争关系研究

Study of Managerial Producing Effort and Product Market Competition

  • 摘要: 在假定企业利润是关于市场竞争度的连续函数、且经营者努力的成本单调递增的基础上,研究建立了经营者生产性努力的最优激励合同模型,并分析得出:增长的市场竞争,一方面增加了企业关闭的可能性,从而增加了对经营者生产性努力的激励;另一方面,也减少了企业获得利润的可能性,从而减少了对经营者生产性努力的激励。该研究结论对于如何在实践中最大程度上根据产品市场竞争程度,匹配激励合同对经营者生产性努力的激励强度具有指导意义。

     

    Abstract: The producing effort incentive model is designed based on incorporation's profit function and manager's effort cost. According to this model, an increasing market competition raises the incorporation closing probability and brings a positive effect on managerial producing effort. But such competition also reduces the firm's profits and generates a negative effect on the prompting of managerial effect. So it is important to match incentive contract with managerial producing effort according to market competence.

     

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