比特搜索生成器的快速密钥恢复攻击

贾艳艳, 胡予濮, 高军涛

贾艳艳, 胡予濮, 高军涛. 比特搜索生成器的快速密钥恢复攻击[J]. 电子科技大学学报, 2011, 40(5): 783-786. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1001-0548.2011.05.028
引用本文: 贾艳艳, 胡予濮, 高军涛. 比特搜索生成器的快速密钥恢复攻击[J]. 电子科技大学学报, 2011, 40(5): 783-786. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1001-0548.2011.05.028
JIA Yan-yan, HU Yu-pu, GAO Jun-tao. Fast Key Recovery Attack on the Bit-Search Generator[J]. Journal of University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, 2011, 40(5): 783-786. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1001-0548.2011.05.028
Citation: JIA Yan-yan, HU Yu-pu, GAO Jun-tao. Fast Key Recovery Attack on the Bit-Search Generator[J]. Journal of University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, 2011, 40(5): 783-786. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1001-0548.2011.05.028

比特搜索生成器的快速密钥恢复攻击

基金项目: 

国家自然科学基金(60833008;60803149);国家973计划(2007CB311201)

详细信息
    作者简介:

    贾艳艳(1983-),女,博士生,主要从事流密码分析方面的研究

  • 中图分类号: TN918.1

Fast Key Recovery Attack on the Bit-Search Generator

  • 摘要: 针对比特搜索生成器,利用Martin Hell关于自缩生成器的攻击思想,提出了一种基于多段密钥流的概率快速密钥恢复攻击。与目前已知的最好攻击结果相比,该攻击能够将计算复杂度从O(20.5LL3)降低到O(20.43LL3),特别地,当L为96时,计算复杂度可以达到O(20.39LL3),所需的数据复杂度为O(NL)。实验结果表明,随着密钥段数的增多,算法的计算复杂度明显减少;密钥长度越长,该算法的攻击效果越好。
    Abstract: For the bit-search generator, a fast probabilistic key recovery attack based on multi segments of keystream bites is presented using the idea of Martin Hell's attack on the self-shrinking generator. Compared with the best known attack, the attack complexity can be significantly reduced from O(20.5LL3) to O(20.43LL3) if we have O(NL) of keystream bits. Here L is the length of the linear feedback shift register (LFSR); N is the number of the segments of keystream bits. The experimental results show that: the complexity of this algorithm can be significantly degraded as the number of attacks increases; The longer the length of the key is, the more efficient our attack is.
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出版历程
  • 收稿日期:  2009-12-27
  • 修回日期:  2010-03-28
  • 刊出日期:  2011-10-14

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